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Abstract
This paper shows that the specification of the Balassa-Samuelson relationship, i.e. the
positive relationship between a country’s per capita income and its national price level,
at the level of the products used in constructing national price levels is different for
‘services’ and ‘manufactures’. It further offers a new candidate explanation for the B-S
relationship in manufactures, which appeals to mismeasured quality. This explanation
yields a second, distinctive, testable prediction: controlling for per capita income, a non-
monotonic relationship should exist between a country’s income inequality and its national
price level. I show that this second prediction is consistent with empirical evidence.
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1. Introduction
The Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) relationship, first introduced in 19641, links the per
capita income level of a country to its price level, as measured by a broad price index.
Balassa and Samuelson showed that as we move towards richer countries, the measured
price level becomes higher (a.k.a. the Penn effect). This represents an apparent violation
of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). Balassa and Samuelson proposed an explanation based
on an appeal to the presence of a service component in the national price level. Although
rich countries are relatively more productive in the traded goods sector, it is hard for them
to establish technological superiority in the labor-intensive service sector. Therefore, the
prices of services will reflect local wages, and will rise relative to the prices of traded goods
as we move from poor countries to rich countries.2
The point of departure of the present paper lies in a purely empirical analysis of the
standard dataset used in the literature. By plotting the B-S relationship for each of the
individual products used in constructing the standard national price level, it is shown that
the form of the relationship differs sharply between two groups of products. Goods in the
first group are essentially ‘pure services’ such as hairdressing. Goods in the second group
are essentially non-services, such as manufactures. It should be expected that goods in
the first group, all of whose costs are ‘local’, should not exhibit PPP. By deleting this
(large) group, I recalculate a new price level. As I am left primarily with manufactures,
the B-S relationship is not expected to hold. Yet I show that the B-S relationship remains
intact for the new price level, i.e. PPP is violated.
The central aim of this paper is to propose a new candidate explanation for the
apparent violation of PPP exhibited in the B-S relationship. Since this explanation,
unlike the traditional explanation, does not appeal to the presence of a ‘local services’
element in the national price level, it is natural to test the present model using both
the standard price level, and the modified price level that excludes the ‘services type’
products. Thus, I am not excluding the part played by services industries in driving the
B-S relationship. Rather, I am suggesting that it is not the whole story.
The candidate explanation for the apparent violation of PPP that I develop in what
follows, is based on an appeal to ‘mismeasured quality’. The idea that quality is not
fully adjusted for in conventional price indices is a long standing theme in the industrial
organization literature. The idea can be traced to the hedonic price literature (Griliches,
1961), and it has been re-explored in recent work by Pakes (2003, 2005).
1Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964).
2This classic explanation has been heavily criticized in the literature. For example, Rogoff (1996)
showed that although there is empirical support for the model when comparisons are made between the
set of ‘all poor countries’ and the set of ‘all rich countries’, this effect is not statistically significant within
either the poor countries group or the rich countries group.
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In the context of calculating national price levels, the ICP (International Comparison
Program) has made process in controlling for quality since the introduction of structured
product descriptions (SPDs) in the 2005 round. The SPDs are used to define products,
the prices of which are collected in every country. The ideal is to have the descriptions as
precisely defined as possible, so that the prices collected based on these are comparable
across countries. However, the design of SPDs has to balance the trade-off between com-
parability and representativity, so SPDs cannot be designed precisely enough to pin down
quality. For example, due to different expenditure patterns in different countries, maybe
a precisely defined item within an expenditure category is a typical item in the consump-
tion basket of country A and hence is representative of its expenditure pattern, but the
item may not be representative in country B, even though its price might be observable in
country B. In this case, instead of using the precisely defined description to match items
between the two countries and missing the criteria of representativity, the ICP may use a
less precisely defined product description so that both countries can have representative
products to match the new description. As a result, the important characteristics that
have caused quality to exist in the disaggregated trade prices as shown in the literature,
such as producer characteristics (brand and country of origin), are generally missing in
the SPDs. Therefore, SPDs still leave large room for cross-country quality variations.
In the present setting, failure to make a full adjustment for quality levels means that,
since the average quality level of goods consumed is higher in richer countries, a spurious
correlation will appear between a country’s income level and its price level.
The model developed in this paper is a hedonic pricing model a` la Rosen (1974). The
key assumption is that income elasticity of quality is positive and is higher for nontraded
goods. The motivation for this assumption is discussed below.
Within this model, we will examine the relation between a country’s income level, and
a price level that is not fully quality adjusted. Given that consumers in the countries with
higher per capita income tend to spend more on the nontraded (‘quality’) goods, this will
imply a higher measured price level in richer countries (the B-S or Penn effect). While this
first result is intuitively obvious, the model also leads to a less obvious, and distinctive,
prediction: controlling for per capita income, income inequality also has an effect on
the national price level and the effect is decreasing in per capita income. The intuition
behind the second prediction is that in the model of Rosen (1974), where consumers’
demand for quality rises in income and the price schedule of quality depends on the
distribution of income, the average price of quality in the market will be the average paid
by consumers with different income levels and hence will depend on the distribution of
income. In testing the empirical predictions of the theory in what follows, I first show
that the second prediction is consistent with empirical evidence using a price level based
on all expenditure categories. I then repeat the exercise using a modified price level which
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excludes the ‘pure services’ categories. It is shown that even when services are excluded,
the B-S relationship survives, and the second distinctive prediction of the present theory
is consistent with the evidence.
This paper contributes to the international pricing literature by providing an alter-
native candidate explanation for the national price level, which is based on mismeasured
quality. In the existing literature, international price differentials, i.e. the violation of
PPP, have been explained by transportation and distribution costs. Crucini and Yil-
mazkuday (2014) use the retail prices of products with the same characteristics to show
that transportation and distribution costs account for over 50% of international price
dispersion at the aggregate level. Variable mark-ups have also been used to explain why
the prices of the same product vary across countries. In Simonovska (2015), the mark-up
of the same apparel or footwear rises with a country’s per capita income because per
capita income increases the consumption of each positively-consumed variety and drives
down the elasticity of substitution between these varieties. In Alessandria and Kaboski
(2011), firms charge higher mark-ups for consumers in richer countries as these consumers
value time at a premium and hence they are less willing to spend time on searching for low
prices. Hummels and Lugovskyy (2009) model the positive relationship between mark-ups
and per capita income in the ideal varieties framework, in which consumers with higher
income are willing to spend more to get closer to their ideal variety. In addition, a series
of papers in the literature have used quality to explain international price differentials.
Goldberg and Verboven (2001) and Imbs et al. (2010) show quality accounts for a large
share of the international dispersion in the prices of cars and TVs. Schott (2004) uses
product level U.S. import data to show unit values are higher for exporters with relatively
high productivity. This finding contradicts the standard trade theory and suggests the
role of quality in explaining the unit values. Crozet, Head and Mayer (2012) introduce
directly measured quality to the Melitz (2003) model of firm heterogeneity in the case of
French Champagne industry and show that quality increases firm-level prices even con-
trolling for productivity. Hallak (2006) shows that countries with high per capita income
tend to buy goods with higher qualities, which imply higher prices. Hallak and Schott
(2011), Khandelwal (2010) and Feenstra and Romalis (2014) disentangle quality from
trade unit values and show the important role of quality in explaining the cross-country
variations in unit values. In contrast, Sutton and Trefler (2016) identify the quality of
a good using a product range, i.e. the range of incomes defined by the income levels of
the poorest and richest exporters of the good, and show how quality affects the mark-up
of the good in a general equilibrium framework. Choi, Hummels and Xiang (2009) use
quality to explain the correlation between income distribution and the distribution of
import prices. Bekkers, Francois and Manchin (2012) also study the relationship between
import prices and two moments of income distribution: per capita income and income
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inequality, but they focus on the role of hierarchic demand3 in driving the relationship.
Similarly, this paper also tries to link income distribution with prices, but instead of the
prices of imports, the emphasis is on the national price level. Fajgelbaum, Grossman and
Helpman (2011) provide a demand-based explanation for the pattern of trade in verti-
cally differentiated goods, while in this paper a demand-based explanation is given for
the role of vertically differentiated goods in the national price level. Bergstrand (1991)
distinguishes empirically the competing theories of the national price level, which include
the supply-based explanations by Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964) and Bhagwati (1984)
and a demand-based explanation. And he finds empirical support for the demand-based
explanation.4
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the basic empirical
analysis leading to the splitting of the product set into 2 groups. Section 3 presents
the model, in which the price schedule of vertically differentiated goods is endogenously
determined by income distribution. The market equilibrium is used to examine how
income distribution affects price levels and expenditure shares. Section 4 tests the model’s
predictions at the aggregate level and at an intermediate level. Section 5 concludes.
2. The B-S Relationship at the Product Level
The point of departure of the present paper lies in a purely empirical analysis of
the standard dataset used in the literature. More specifically, the B-S relationship is
explored at the disaggregate level. The disaggregate price levels used in this paper are from
the International Comparison Program (ICP) 2005 benchmark dataset, which includes
the price levels of 129 basic headings for 146 countries.5 Basic headings are defined as
the most disaggregate price level, at which there exists matching expenditure data from
national accounts. These price levels of basic headings are just the disaggregate price
levels underlying the national price level in the Penn World Table.
One of the standard specifications characterizing the B-S relationship is
p = a+ bw, (1)
3Consumers extend their set of goods consumed as income rises.
4Hassan (2015) shows that the pattern of structural change can lead to an U-shape relationship
between per capita income and national price levels. He mainly uses the supply side to explain national
price differentials resulting from structural change. My demand-side model and empirics complements
the supply-side model and empirics by Hassan (2015). In particular, when I include covariates intended
to capture Hassan’s work, I find that my own key variables fall in magnitude by about one third but
remain very statistically significant.
5All the results in this paper hold both when the 129 basic headings are used and when individual
and collective services are excluded, as they are classified as comparison-resistant areas by the ICP due
to their imperfect price concepts.
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where p denotes the national price level and w denotes GDP per capita.6 Here we begin
from specification (1), but we re-interpret it so as to distinguish explicitly between local
costs, represented here as labour costs7, and costs associated with internationally tradable
items. We note that PPP is expected to apply only to the second element.
Now this distinction between local and international costs has always been regarded
as (at least a contributing factor in) driving the apparent violation of PPP. But here,
we make this explicit, with a view to identifying and separating the industries, for which
costs are mainly local labour costs.
The specification in (1) can be interpreted as follows: if the market is competitive,
price is equal to marginal cost, which is a weighted average of local labour costs and
international costs,
p = MC = ϕw + (1− ϕ)ι, (2)
where ϕ is the weight and ι is the world price of the internationally tradable items, and
is constant across countries. Therefore, its reduced form yields the linear specification in
(1). And linking (2) to (1) tells us that b is equal to ϕ and a is equal to (1 − ϕ)ι. To
identify and separate those products with local labour costs as their major costs, I run
the regression implied by (1), on a product by product basis, and plot the estimates of a
and b in Figure 1.8
The open diamonds represent services (designated the ‘S-group’) and the dark squares
represent non-services (designated the ‘M-group’). Please see Appendix B.2 for the prod-
uct classification. On inspection, we have two observations. First, we notice that there
is a sharp split between pure services and non-services. For services, we expect that ϕ
is large so b is large and a is small. Indeed, b is high with a mean 0.615 and a standard
deviation 0.215 while a is statistically not very different from 0 with a mean 0.382 and
a standard deviation 0.235, suggesting that their price levels are mainly determined by
local labour costs. For non-services, ϕ is smaller. So we expect that b is smaller and a
is larger. Indeed, b is low with a mean 0.427 and a standard deviation 0.253 while a is
significantly positive with a mean 0.815 and a standard deviation 0.302. This is consistent
with the fact that their price levels rely less on local labour costs. In addition, a multi-
variate test of means can also be performed to test the hypothesis that both the means
of as and the means of bs are equalized between the S-group and the M-group, allowing
for heterogeneous covariance matrices across the two groups. The test result shows that
the hypothesis is rejected at 1% level with the F -statistic being equal to 40.13. Second,
6This specification is used in Balassa (1964).
7Other local costs are rent, electricity etc., but these non-tradable items should, like labour, reflect
local conditions.
8Appendix C.1 provides a modified version of Figure 1 showing the industry labels, in which we can
see more clearly the role played by tradables in the service sectors.
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there is a large amount of heterogeneity in the estimates of a and b within non-services.
Some non-services do not exhibit the B-S relationship as their estimates of b are close to
zero. While some other non-services exhibit a strong B-S relationship with a significantly
positive estimate of b.
Figure 1: The B-S Estimation: Services vs. Non-Services
−
.5
0
.5
1
1
.5
0 .5 1 1.5 2
Services Non−Services
b
a
Notes: a and b are the intercept and slope from the B-S estimation. The open di-
amonds and the dark squares represent the estimates from services and non-services
respectively. Data from Zimbabwe are not included in the estimation due to its volatile
exchange rate in 2005. The basic heading of Passenger Transport by Air is excluded
from the figure, as its B-S relationship is downward-sloping.
Now these observations can also be analysed using alternative specifications. A second
and more popular formulation of the B-S relationship is
p = a+ b lnw, (3)
where the log of GDP per capita is used on the r.h.s. In Appendix C.2, I plot the price level
relative to the U.S. (p/pU.S.) against ln(GDP per capita/US GDP per capita) separately
for each of the ICP basic headings.9 In each plot, one data point corresponds to one
country. We expect the plots to have one of the following three patterns.
9Two basic headings, “Net Purchases Abroad” and “Balance of Exports and Imports”, are excluded,
as they are not supposed to be covered by the scope of this paper.
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1. In the extreme where ϕ = 1 so that all costs are local, we expect p = w and hence
p/pU.S. = exp(ln(GDP per capita/US GDP per capita)).
That is, we expect an exponential relationship. Panel (a) of Figure 2 displays this rela-
tionship for the case of Hospital Services.
2. In the other extreme where ϕ = 010 so that all costs are international, we expect
p = a. That is, the data should line up horizontally. Panel (b) of Figure 2 displays this
relationship for Other Cereals.
3. Intermediate cases should display a weaker exponential relationship. Panel (c) of
Figure 2 displays this relationship for Furniture.
The Figure 2 plots are representative. The more interested reader should look at all
127 plots in Appendix C.2 to convince himself or herself that these three types are very
much in evidence and appear where expected, i.e. the exponential relationship occurs for
most services and the horizontal relationship occurs for most highly-traded goods.
Now the central theme of this paper is that, even when we eliminate those products
that are primarily ‘services’, whose costs are predominantly local labour costs, the B-S
relationship remains clear, i.e. the violation of PPP is still evident. This can be seen in
Figure 3, where the B-S relationships, in its basic form (1), are plotted using the national
price level and the price level of non-services.11 Both show a positive relationship. In
addition, to check that the B-S relationship found for the price level of non-services is not
due to the aggregation method used in aggregating the prices at the product level to the
price level of non-services, I also pool the B-S scatter plots of all M -group products in
Appendix C.2 together and fit the pooled scatter plot with a non-parametric regression
curve without imposing any functional form. Figure 4 shows that the non-parametric
fitted curve also displays a B-S relationship.12 The above results motivate our search
for an alternative contributing factor, that will hold even among industries that are pure
’manufacturing’ industries (M-group products).
10Of course, ϕ can never be exactly 0 because there are always some labour costs.
11The price levels of non-services are constructed using the standard Geary and Khamis (GK) method
by the PWT and the ICP Benchmark Dataset 2005.
12A small number of observations above 3 are not plotted.
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Figure 2: Three Archetypal Forms of Price-Wealth Relationships
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Figure 3: The B-S Relationship for Alternative Price Indexes (Based on Equation (1))
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(a) The B-S Relationship Using the National Price
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(b) The B-S Relationship Using the Modified Price
Level that Excludes ‘Services Type’ Products
In the next section, I develop an alternative candidate explanation for the B-S re-
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Figure 4: The Pooled Scatter Plots of all M -group Products
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Notes: The non-parametric curve with 95% confidence intervals is obtained
using local-mean smoothing with a bandwidth of 1.5.
lationship, appropriate to the M -group products, based on an appeal to mismeasured
quality.
3. A ‘Mismeasured Quality’ Interpretation
This section begins with the basic intuition behind the distinctive prediction of the
model, i.e. the non-monotonic relationship between income inequality and the national
price level. Then it describes the consumer’s problem, in which an empirically motivated
key assumption is reflected, the producer’s problem and the market equilibrium. Finally,
an analytical solution of the equilibrium is used to derive propositions regarding how in-
come distribution affects expenditure shares and price levels at disaggregate and aggregate
levels.
3.1. The Basic Intuition
The model developed in this paper is a hedonic pricing model a` la Rosen (1974),
in which consumers and firms choose their optimal positions along an equilibrium price
schedule p(z), where z is a vector of characteristics of the good in question. As firms take
the equilibrium price schedule as given in their profit maximization problem, the price of
any quality good is equal to its marginal cost. Hence the mark-up is fixed to be 1 and
does not play any role in this paper.
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The focus of the analysis lies in establishing a relationship between a country’s level
of income, and – more importantly – the form of income distribution in the country, and
the pattern of demand for both ‘quality’ goods and ‘homogeneous’ goods.
The novel prediction of the model is that controlling for per capita income, income
inequality also affects the national price level. The basic intuition of this is: a higher
income inequality implies that a consumer has to pay more to switch from a low quality
good to a high quality good as the prices of high quality goods are raised by the newly
created rich people. As a result, consumers will lower the share of income spent on
quality goods and increase the share on homogeneous goods. A simple illustration of this
mechanism is: suppose a country’s per capita income is µ∗ and its income distribution is
made up of three income groups with equal population. The top income group consumes
a top quality good, the middle income group consumes a middle quality good and the
bottom income group consumes a bottom quality good. Given the same Cobb-Douglas
utility function, everyone spends a same fraction θ of his/her income on quality goods.
As quality cannot be fully controlled for, the implied price level of quality goods will
depend on the average expenditure on it, which is equal to µ∗θ. Now consider a mean-
preserving spread of income distribution, which means that there are now less people in
the middle income group and more people in the top and bottom groups. This income
redistribution will increase the quantity demanded of the top and bottom quality goods.
As the marginal cost function of the quality good is increasing in the number of units
produced, the increased demand will increase the prices of the top and bottom quality
goods, resulting in a more convex price function. With a more convex price function of
quality goods and the unit elasticity of substitution in the Cobb-Douglas utility function,
all consumers will spend a lower fraction θ′ (< θ) of income on quality goods. As a result,
its measured price level will be lower, as the average expenditure on quality goods, is
now reduced to µ∗θ′. This is the mechanism through which income inequality affects the
national price level in the present model.
3.2. The Model I: The Consumer’s Problem
On the consumer’s side, in every country there is a unit mass of consumers indexed by
income level c. The income distribution is assumed (conventionally) to follow the Pareto
distribution characterized by two parameters kc and cm, where cm is the lower bound of
income level c and kc is the shape parameter. Hence the probability density function of
income is
f(c) = kcc
kc
mc
−(kc+1), kc > 1, c ∈ [cm,∞).
Quality enters the utility function in a way similar to Flam and Helpman (1987), who
introduce quality to their model of North-South trade. That is, consumer preferences are
represented by a utility function v(x, z), where x is the quantity of a homogeneous good,
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denoted by X, and z is the quality of a vertically differentiated good denoted by Z. In
this paper, I further assume that the homogeneous good is tradable and the vertically
differentiated good is nontradable and hence locally priced. Therefore, a consumer with
income c chooses the quantity of the homogeneous good and the quality level of the
vertically differentiated good to solve the following utility maximization problem:
max
x,z
v(x, z)
s.t. c = x+ p(z). (4)
where p(z) is the nonlinear hedonic price function of the vertically differentiated good,
which is set locally, and the price of the homogeneous good is one.
The utility function assumed above reflects two key assumptions in the consumer’s
problem. The first is that income elasticity of quality varies across goods and is high
for many goods. To reflect this, I include both homogeneous goods (with zero income
elasticity of quality) and vertically differentiated goods (with positive income elasticity of
quality) in the model. I motivate this assumption by reference to Bils and Klenow (2001),
which provide empirical support for this assumption. They estimate income elasticities
of quality and income elasticities of quantity for 66 durable goods and find that income
elasticity of quality is positive and non-negligible.13 For many goods in their sample,
income elasticity of quality is higher relative to that of quantity. For example, for goods
such as window coverings, curtains and drapes, the quality consumed rises sharply relative
to the quantity as household income rises. In contrast, for goods such as clothing and
footwear, the quantity consumed tends to increase by more than the quality as household
income rises. The second assumption is that income elasticity of quality is higher for
nontraded good. To reflect this, the homogeneous good is assumed to be tradable and the
vertically differentiated good is assumed to be nontradable in the model. This assumption
can be supported by a significant negative relationship between tradability and income
elasticity of quality for the goods studied in Bils and Klenow (2001). The details are
shown in Appendix C.4. In addition to tradable homogeneous goods and non-traded
vertically differentiated goods, I abstract from other types of goods for the following
reasons. First, I let traded goods be homogeneous for analytical simplicity. Second,
homogeneous nontradables, which are the focus of the B-S model, are not included in
the present model. Furthermore, the significant negative relationship between tradability
and income elasticity of quality also suggests that we can abstract from other goods and
focus on the traded homogeneous goods and the nontraded vertically differentiated goods
13Appendix C.3 provides additional empirical evidence on the relative importance of income elasticities
of quality and quantity for food, houses, clothes and vehicles.
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in the model without loss of generality.
In what follows I assume the utility function v(x, z) is a standard Cobb-Douglas utility
function, i.e. v(x, z) = xαzβ, α+β = 1. Given this, the Lagrangian for the problem in (4)
is given by
L = xαzβ + λ[c− x− p(z)].
First-order necessary conditions imply that
vz
vx
= p′(z) and hence
β
α
x
z
= p′(z).
Combining it with the budget constraint x = c− p(z), we have
c = (α/β)zp′(z) + p(z), (5)
which implies that if a consumer chooses a vertically differentiated good with quality z,
then his/her income is equal to (α/β)zp′(z) + p(z). We denote this consumer’s income
conditional on choosing quality z by h(z). Given the pdf of income f(c) and the relation-
ship between income and quality c = h(z) or z = h−1(c), we can write down the pdf of z,
which is denoted as φ(z), as follows:
φ(z) = f(h(z))
∣∣∣∣∂h(z)∂z
∣∣∣∣ , (6)
where |·| denotes the absolute value. The mapping from the pdf of c to the pdf of z can
be illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Mapping From Income Distribution to Distribution of Quality Demanded
Incomec
f(c)
cm c∗
Qualityz
Qd(z)
zm z∗
c∗ = (α/β)z∗p′(z∗) + p(z∗) = h(z∗)
Qd(z) = φ(z) = f(h(z))|∂h(z)
∂z
|
Notes: Given the exogenous income distribution f(c) and the relationship between in-
come and quality derived from the utility maximization problem c = h(z), the distri-
bution of quality demanded Qd(z) can be obtained. c∗ = (α/β)z∗p′(z∗) + p(z∗) is the
relationship between an individual’s income c∗ and the quality he/she chooses to consume
z∗.
Substituting for h(z) and f(·) in (6) yields
φ(z) = f(
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z))
∣∣∣∣∣∂[
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z)]
∂z
∣∣∣∣∣
= kcc
kc
m [
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z)]−(kc+1)
∣∣∣∣αβ [p′(z) + zp′′(z)] + p′(z)
∣∣∣∣ .
If we denote the quantity demanded for the good with quality z by Qd(z), then the
market demand in a small interval dz near quality z is given by the product of the pdf of
quality around z, φ(z), and the length of the interval:
Qd(z)dz = kcc
kc
m [
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z)]−(kc+1)
∣∣∣∣αβ [p′(z) + zp′′(z)] + p′(z)
∣∣∣∣ dz. (7)
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3.3. The Model II: The Producer’s Problem
Although different countries have different income distributions, the supply side is the
same for all countries. In every country, there is a unit mass of firms producing vertically
differentiated goods indexed by product quality z. The distribution of the firms is assumed
to be the Pareto distribution characterized by two parameters kz and zm, where zm is the
lower bound of product quality z and kz is the shape parameter.
14 Therefore, the pdf of
z takes the following form:
g(z) = kzz
kz
m z
−(kz+1), kz > 1, z ∈ [zm,∞). (8)
As in Rosen (1974), producers in all countries are assumed to have the same cost
function ∆(M, z) = AzM
τzγ, τ > 1, γ > 1, where Az is the productivity parameter and
M denotes the number of units of the product with quality z that the firm produces. It
is assumed that τ > 1 and γ > 1, which ensure that total cost is a convex function in M
and z.
The producers are price takers. Furthermore, it is assumed that the producers can
vary M but not z. (i.e. a producer’s quality is a given parameter in the short run).
Therefore, the producer’s problem is to maximize profit by choosing its output level M :
max
M
Mp(z)−∆(M, z).
The first-order conditions imply that
p(z) =
∂∆
∂M
= AzτM
τ−1zγ.
Thus,
M(z) = (
p(z)
Azτzγ
)1/(τ−1). (9)
If we denote the firms’ output of z as Qs(z), then the market supply in a small interval
dz near quality z is given by the product of the pdf of the firms around z, the quantity
14The reasons for using the Pareto distribution, a power law probability distribution, are not only
that a closed form solution can be obtained but also that this assumption is consistent with empirical
evidence. Gaffeo, Gallegati and Palestrini (2003) analyze the average size distribution of a pool of the G7
group firms over the period 1987-2000. They find that the empirical distributions are all consistent with
the power law. Luttmer (2007) also shows that the firm size distribution follows the Pareto distribution
over much of its range using the U.S. data in 2002. In the model of this paper, the quality of a firm is a
power transformation of the size of the firm, so it is reasonable to assume quality also follows the Pareto
distribution as the Pareto distribution is close under power transformation.
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supplied by each firm producing quality z and the length of the interval:
Qs(z)dz = g(z)M(z)dz
= kzz
kz
m z
−(kz+1)(
p(z)
Azτzγ
)1/(τ−1)dz. (10)
Figure 6 shows the mapping from the distribution of firms by quality to the distribution
of quality supplied.
Figure 6: Mapping From Firm Distribution by Quality to Distribution of Quality Supplied
Qualityz
g(z)
zm z0
g(z0)dz
Qualityz
Qs(z)
zm z0
g(z0)M(z0)dz
Qs(z) = g(z)[
p(z)
Azτzγ
]1/(τ−1)
Notes: Given the initial distribution of firms g(z) in (8) and the output of each firm M(z)
in (9), the distribution of quality supplied Qs(z) can be derived, as illustrated, and takes
the form of (10). g(z0)dz is the number of firms that produce z0 and g(z0)M(z0)dz is
total quantity of z0 supplied.
3.4. Market Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined as a triple {z(c),M(z), p(z)}, where z(c) is the policy func-
tion for consumers, M(z) is the policy function for producers, and p(z) is the price sched-
ule, such that:
1. z(c) solves the consumer’s utility maximization problem taking p(z) as given.
2. M(z) solves the producer’s profit maximization problem taking p(z) as given.
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3. Market clearing: demand is equal to supply for Z goods, i.e., Qs(z) = Qd(z) for all
z.
3.5. An Analytical Solution
In equilibrium, we must have the market clearing condition Qs(z)dz = Qd(z)dz. It can
be used to solve for a solution15 to the equilibrium price function, in which the parameters
of the price function can be expressed as functions of the income distribution parameters
kc and cm. This is summarized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The price function
p(z) = b(kc, cm)z
d(kc), z ∈ [z¯m,∞)
where
b(kc, cm) =

kcc
kc
m
[
α
β
kz+γ/(τ−1)
kc+1/(τ−1) + 1
]−kc kz+γ/(τ−1)
kc+1/(τ−1)
kzzkzm (
1
Azτ
)1/(τ−1)

(τ−1)/[kc(τ−1)+1]
, (11)
d(kc) =
kz + γ/(τ − 1)
kc + 1/(τ − 1) , d
′(kc) < 0 (12)
and z¯m is such that
cm =
α
β
zmp
′(zm) + p(zm).
satisfies the market clearing condition Qs(z) = Qd(z).
Proof : See Appendix A.1.
3.6. Income Distribution and Expenditure Shares
It can be shown that the expenditure share on Z goods, i.e. the price paid for Z good
divided by income p(z)/c, crucially depends on the convexity of the price function d as
p(z)
c
=
p(z)
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z)
=
bzd
α
β
bdzd + bzd
=
1
α
β
d+ 1
. (13)
The first equality follows from the first order condition (5) and the second equality follows
from the form of price function in Lemma 1. Furthermore, as the convexity d crucially
depends on income distribution parameter kc from (12), we can now derive the relationship
between income distribution and expenditure shares. As the Gini coefficient and per
capita income of the Pareto distribution can be expressed as analytical functions of the
15I adopt the standard method of undetermined coefficients to find a particular solution of the form
p(z) = bzd, with b, d > 0, which is then substituted into the market clearing condition to solve for the
values of the parameters b and d (Zwillinger (1997), P415).
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distribution parameters, viz. Gini = 1/(2kc − 1) and µ = cmkc/(kc − 1), we can also
think of the Pareto distribution as governed by two independent parameters Gini and
µ. Therefore, from (12) and (13) we can derive how the Gini coefficient and per capita
income affect the convexity of the price function d and hence the expenditure shares. The
results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. (Income Distribution and Expenditure Shares) Income inequality has a
positive impact on the expenditure share of X goods and a negative impact on the expen-
diture share of Z goods. Per capita income has no impact on expenditure shares.
Proof : See Appendix A.2.
The intuition behind the first prediction of Proposition 1 is that an increase in the
Gini coefficient implies an increase in d and hence a more convex price function. As
a result, the marginal utility derived from Z goods becomes more expensive. Due to
the high substitutability between X goods and Z goods, consumers will spend a smaller
fraction of their expenditure on Z goods and more on X goods. This mechanism of
how income inequality affects expenditure shares is crucial in determining how income
inequality influences the price levels, which will be provided in the next subsection. The
second prediction is a direct implication of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. The Cobb-
Douglas utility function is used for analytical simplicity, as it can yield a closed form
solution. However, with more general utility functions, such as the CES utility function,
the results in this paper will still hold as long as the elasticity of substitution between the
two goods is high enough.
3.7. Income Distribution and Price Levels
We now explore the implications of the model for disaggregate and aggregate price
levels and how the implications are affected by the extent to which quality is adjusted.
The two polar cases are:
1. Perfect quality measurement.
2. Quality is not fully adjusted using hedonics such as in Pakes (2003).
First, in the case of perfect quality measurement, quality can be fully observed, so
in terms of the setting of the model we will be able to use the hedonic regression to
estimate the parameters in the price function p(z). Then the price schedule p(z) from
each country can be used to compare the price level of Z goods across countries. One
way of constructing the price level of Z goods while minimizing the impact of quality
in it is to use pj(z0) = bjz
dj
0 as the price level of Z goods in country j, where bj and
dj are the estimated parameters in country j and z0 is a constant level of quality across
countries. As a result, the price levels of Z goods in country i and country j are given by
pi(z0) = biz
di
0 and pj(z0) = bjz
dj
0 . The difference between the two price levels are only due
to the different bs and ds but not due to different qualities. Although in this case quality
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can be fully controlled for, (11) implies that there still exists the B-S relationship. To
see this, suppose we keep a country’s Gini coefficient constant and increase its per capita
income, this implies a constant kc but a higher cm in the Pareto distribution. From (12)
and (11), d will stay constant but b will go up, resulting in an upward shift of the price
schedule p(z). Hence, for any quality goods, the price will be higher than before. This is
because a higher level of per capita income will increase the demand for the higher quality
Z goods and the resulting higher output will increase their prices as the marginal cost
is increasing in output. The magnitude of this B-S relationship can be measured by the
elasticity of the price level p(z0) with respect to per capita income µ, which is equal to
kc(τ − 1)/[kc(τ − 1) + 1] from (11).
However, the above procedures face a prominent practical issue. The issue is that
quality cannot be perfectly controlled for Z goods. Pakes (2003) shows how to use hedonics
to adjust quality biases in the price indexes of quality goods due to the introduction of
new goods in the case of PC, as the traditional price indexes used by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) do not make any adjustment for the differences in the utility per dollar
between the new good and the good(s) it replaces. However, the adjustment procedures
require a complete dataset on the characteristics of the goods, which is impossible in the
case of cross-country price comparison. Without the level of quality being observed and
the price schedule p(z) being estimated, the common practice of constructing the price
index of Z goods is to use some partial quality adjustment methods such as matching
precisely defined items and calculate the average of the observed prices of all Z goods.
As a result, the price index of Z goods will generally depend on the average expenditure
on Z goods and these two will become equal when there is no quality adjustment at all.
The consequence of the practice is that the resulting price level is less informative than
in the case of perfect quality measurement as a higher price level could be either due to
higher values of b and d in the price function or simply due to the fact that the prices
of higher quality goods have been observed. This will lead to a higher B-S effect, i.e. a
higher elasticity of the price level with respect to per capita income.
To see this, suppose there is no quality adjustment and we simply use the average
expenditure on Z goods, which is equal to16
p = µ
β
α kz+γ/(τ−1)
(1/Gini+1)/2+1/(τ−1) + β
, (14)
as its price level, then the elasticity of the price level with respect to per capita income
µ is equal to 1, compared with a elasticity of kc(τ − 1)/[kc(τ − 1) + 1] in the previous
case of full quality adjustment. Motivated by the different elasticities in the two polar
16Please see Appendix A.3 for the derivation.
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cases, I assume the general form of the relationship between the measured price level
with partial quality adjustment p∗ and the average expenditure p is p∗ = pη, where
kc(τ − 1)/[kc(τ − 1) + 1] < η < 1. Here, η is used to govern the extent to which quality
is adjusted. η − kc(τ − 1)/[kc(τ − 1) + 1] is the part of the elasticity of the price level
with respect to per capita income that is due to imperfect quality adjustment. Given this
assumption, we can derive how income distribution affects the measured price levels with
partial quality adjustment at the disaggregate and aggregate levels and the role played
by η in it.
First, the effects of per capita income and income inequality on the price level of Z
goods are derived. The results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. (Income Distribution and the Disaggregate Price Level) Per capita in-
come has a positive impact on the price level of Z goods (∂p∗/∂µ > 0), whereas income
inequality has a negative impact (∂p∗/∂Gini < 0). Moreover, the effect of income inequal-
ity on the price level of Z goods is decreasing in per capita income (∂2p∗/∂Gini∂µ < 0).
Proof : See Appendix A.4.
Proposition 2 first shows that the B-S effect exists for the price level of Z goods.
Moreover, from the proof, it is easy to see that the effect would disappear if η could go
to zero. The dependence of the B-S effect on η implies that this effect can be attributed
to two sources. One source is imperfect quality adjustment, which is governed by η −
kc(τ − 1)/[kc(τ − 1) + 1]. The other source is increasing marginal cost, which is governed
by kc(τ − 1)/[kc(τ − 1) + 1]. The magnitude of kc(τ − 1)/[kc(τ − 1) + 1] crucially depends
on the cost function parameters τ and could be arbitrarily small as τ approaches 1 from
above, while the magnitude of imperfect quality adjustment is exogenous and is likely
to be large given the difficulty of controlling for quality in reality. Therefore, imperfect
quality adjustment plays an important role in the B-S relationship of Z goods.
Proposition 2 also shows that keeping per capita income constant, income inequality
can also affect the price level of Z goods. This is because the price level of Z goods depends
on the average expenditure on Z goods, which is the product of the expenditure share and
per capita income. As income inequality has a negative impact on the expenditure share of
Z goods as shown in Proposition 1, income inequality can affect the price level of Z goods
through the expenditure share and the effect is decreasing in per capita income. Moreover,
from the proof the impact of income inequality increases as η goes up, suggesting the
impact of income inequality decreases with the degree of quality adjustment. As the price
level of X goods is constant across countries, the above effects of income distribution on
the price level of Z goods will play important roles in the relationship between income
distribution and the national price level.
To investigate the implications of income distribution for the national price level, we
need to construct an aggregate price index for both X goods and Z goods. Here for
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analytical simplicity, I use the bilateral Fisher index, which is the geometric mean of the
Laspeyres index and the Paasche index, as a proxy for the national price level. This is
because the methods of computing the national price level in practice, such as the Eltero-
Koves-Szulc (EKS) and Geary and Khamis (GK) methods, are not analytically tractable,
but Deaton and Heston (2010) has shown that the national price level in the Penn World
Table can be well approximated by the geometric mean of the Laspeyres index and the
Paasche index. The Laspeyres and Paasche indices are both weighted averages of the price
ratios of disaggregate price levels relative to the base country, the U.S. In the Laspeyres
index, the weights are given by the expenditure shares of the base country, while in the
Paasche index the weights are given by the expenditure shares of the country in question.
In the model of this paper, there are two types of goods: X goods and Z goods, so the
Paasche index PP , the Laspeyres index PL and the bilateral Fisher index PF are defined
as follows:
PP ≡
(
1
1
sharex +
p∗0
p∗
sharez
)−1
=
(
αd
αd+ β
+
p∗0
p∗
β
αd+ β
)−1
,
PL ≡ 1
1
sharex,0 +
p∗
p∗0
sharez,0 =
αd0
αd0 + β
+
p∗
p∗0
β
αd0 + β
,
PF ≡
√
PPPL,
where 0 is used in the subscript to denote variables from the base country, i.e. U.S. p∗0 and
p∗ are the measured price levels of Z goods in the base country and the country in question.
Given the definition of the national price level, in Proposition 3 the results regarding how
income distribution affects the national price level are shown. More specifically, to make
the results comparable with the empirical tests in Section 4, the results regarding how
the log of per capita income and the Gini coefficient affect the log of the national price
level are shown.
Proposition 3. (Income Distribution and the National Price Level) The impact of per
capita income on the national price level is positive: the elasticity of the national price
level with respect to per capita income is positive (ePF ,µ ≡ (∂PF/∂µ)µ/PF > 0). The
impact of income inequality on the national price level is decreasing in per capita income:
the semi-elasticity of the national price level with respect to income inequality is decreasing
in per capita income (∂ePF ,Gini/∂µ < 0, where ePF ,Gini ≡ (∂PF/∂Gini)/PF ).
Proof : See Appendix A.5.
Empirically, this proposition suggests that in a cross-sectional setting, one should
regress the national price level on per capita income and the interaction of per capita
income and the Gini coefficient, where we expect the coefficient on per capita income to
be positive and the coefficient on the interaction term to be negative.
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Given the constant price level of X goods, we can use the intuition derived from
Proposition 2 regarding the effects of income distribution on the price level of Z goods
to understand the effects of income distribution on the national price level. First, given
the positive impact of per capita income on the price level of Z goods, per capita income
will have a positive impact on the national price level, which is a weighted average of the
price levels of X goods and Z goods. However, the elasticity of the national price level
with respect to per capita income is less than that of the price level of Z goods as the
elasticity of the price level of X goods with respect to per capita income is 0.
Second, although income inequality has a negative impact on the price level and the
expenditure share of Z goods, it is not necessary that income inequality has a negative
impact on the national price level. This is because the impact of income inequality on the
national price level also depends on the relative magnitudes of the price ratio of X goods
and Z goods relative to the base country as shown in the definition of the national price
level.
Finally, as income inequality has a negative impact on the expenditure share of Z
goods and the price level of Z goods and the national price level both depend on the
average expenditure on Z goods, which is the product of the expenditure share on Z
goods and per capita income, the impact of income inequality on the price level of Z
goods and the national price level will be decreasing in per capita income.
To summarize, the model developed in this section predicts the B-S relationship, i.e.
the positive relationship between per capita income and the national price level, and
a non-monotonic relationship between income inequality and the national price level.
And from the proof the magnitudes of all these impacts depends positively on η, which is
negatively related to the extent to which quality is adjusted. Therefore the model provides
a mismeasured quality explanation of the relationship between the national price level and
income distribution.
Compared with this explanation, the other explanations of the B-S effect cited in
the introduction generally have a demand side based on the representative agent frame-
work, i.e. all the consumers in a country are represented by a single consumer. As a
result, income distribution is degenerate and no relationship between income inequal-
ity and prices can be implied from these models. However, there are three exceptions,
in which a non-degenerate income distribution is specified. They are Bekkers, Francois
and Manchin (2012), Choi, Hummels and Xiang (2009) and Fajgelbaum, Grossman and
Helpman (2011). Due to the presence of income distribution in these models, they can
generate implications for the relationship between income distribution and prices. In
Bekkers, Francois and Manchin (2012), they use trade data and find a positive relation-
ship between per capita income of importing countries and import prices and a negative
relationship between their income inequalities and import prices. They propose three
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models to explain these empirical findings, including a quality expansion model, an ideal
variety model and a hierarchic demand model. All three models can generate a positive
relationship between per capita income and import prices. But only the hierarchic de-
mand model can generate a negative relationship between income inequality and import
prices, while the other two models generate the opposite. As their paper is mainly about
import prices, and my paper is mainly about national price levels, there is no direct com-
parison between the two papers. However, Proposition 2 of my paper does predict three
relationships between income distribution and the price of Z goods, i.e. the vertically
differentiated goods in my model, which are a positive relationship between per capita in-
come and the price of Z goods, a negative relationship between income inequality and the
price of Z goods and the impact of income inequality on the price of Z goods is decreas-
ing in per capita income. If we view import prices in their paper as prices of vertically
differentiated goods in my model, then their preferred explanation, i.e. the hierarchic
demand model can generate the first two relationships in Proposition 2, i.e. the positive
relationship between per capita income and import prices, and the negative relationship
between income inequality and import prices but not the third relationship, i.e. the im-
pact of income inequality on the price of Z goods is decreasing in per capita income.
The third relationship is crucial in generating the nonlinear relationship between income
inequality and national price levels in my paper, which is shown to be consistent with
the data. Choi, Hummels and Xiang (2009) theoretically derive the general relationship
between income distribution and distribution of import prices. However, no conclusive
relationship between income inequality and price levels can be implied from their results,
as if we want to do so, we have to make assumptions about the functional form of income
distribution and how to aggregate prices into price levels. As a result, the relationship be-
tween income inequality and price levels will depend on the assumption made and will be
in general ambiguous. Fajgelbaum, Grossman and Helpman (2011) develop a framework
to study patterns of trade in horizontally and vertically differentiated products. In their
model, a non-degenerate income distribution is specified and goods with higher quality
imply higher prices. However, their model’s prediction regarding how income inequal-
ity affects the average quality demanded in the economy is ambiguous. As a result, no
conclusive relationship between income inequality and prices can be predicted by their
model. Therefore, existing explanations of the B-S effect cannot be easily extended or
modified to account for the empirical relationship between income distribution and the
national price level found in my paper, but my paper provides a relatively simple model
to account for that.
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4. Empirical Evidence
This section tests the model’s predictions at two levels: the aggregate level and an
intermediate level. The aggregate price levels are from the Penn World Table (PWT),
which are commonly used to compare price levels across countries or compute real GDPs
in constant internationally comparable dollars. To construct these price levels, the Inter-
national Comparison Program (ICP) at the World Bank collects the prices of a detailed
list of goods and services in selected countries and years. The countries from which the
ICP has collected data on prices in a given year are called benchmark countries and the
given year is called a benchmark year. The collected detailed prices are first aggregated
into the price levels of basic headings. Basic headings are the most disaggregate level
at which there exist matching expenditure data from national accounts. The PWT then
aggregates the price levels at the basic heading level in the benchmark dataset into a
national price level using expenditure data from national accounts as weights. For non-
benchmark countries and years, the price levels are inferred from fitted values of price
regression run on benchmark dataset. In this paper, I concentrate on the benchmark
year 2005, for which national price levels are available in the PWT and disaggregate price
levels are available in the ICP Benchmark Dataset 2005.
4.1. Testing the Model: the Standard Index
In addition to the B-S relationship, i.e. a positive relationship between per capita
income and the national price level, the model developed in Section 3 also predicts that
income inequality can affect the national price level and the impact is decreasing in per
capita income. In this subsection, these model’s predictions are tested using data at the
aggregate level.
To show that not only per capita income but also income inequality is important in
determining the national price level, I extend the regression in Rogoff (1996) by introduc-
ing the Gini coefficient as an additional explanatory variable to investigate if it can help
to explain national price differentials.
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Figure 7: Price Level versus GDP per capita in 2005 (U.S.=1)
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Notes: The fitted line is obtained by regressing the logarithm of National Price
Level on the logarithm of GDP per capita.
Table 1: Income Distribution and the National Price Level
Relative Price Level log(Pj/PU.S.)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Yj/YU.S.) 0.186
∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗
(0.0171) (0.0854) (0.117) (0.0857)
Gini -2.623∗∗∗ -2.651∗∗∗ -2.594∗∗∗
(0.510) (0.606) (0.510)
Gini× log(Yj/YU.S.) -1.359∗∗∗ -1.649∗∗∗ -1.335∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.307) (0.218)
VAT -0.00108
(0.00405)
Population -0.000182
(0.000157)
Constant -0.232∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.905∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗
(0.0409) (0.192) (0.241) (0.192)
Observations 189 153 90 153
R2 0.388 0.541 0.717 0.545
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
25
First, to show that the problem with the Balassa-Samuelson relationship pointed out
in Rogoff (1996) still persists in 2005, Figure 3 in Rogoff (1996) is replicated in Figure
7 using the 2005 data in PWT 7.1. I exclude Zimbabwe from the figure due to its very
volatile exchange rate in 2005. As shown in Figure 3 of Rogoff (1996), Figure 7 still shows
that the B-S relationship performs well for the whole sample but does not perform well
either within poor countries or within rich countries, suggesting the need to find other
important explanatory variables of the national price level.
Guided by the importance of income inequality in the model, I replicate the regressions
in Rogoff (1996) but adding the Gini coefficient as an extra explanatory variable, as shown
in Table 1. Pj/PU.S. is the price level of country j relative to the United States, and
Yj/YU.S. is country j’s relative per capita income. Results from Regressions (1) to (4) are
consistent with the B-S relationship that countries with higher per capita income tend to
have higher price levels as the estimated coefficients of relative income are all significantly
positive.
In Regression (2), we turn to the key prediction of the paper. When the Gini coeffi-
cient and the interaction of the Gini coefficient and the relative income are included in
Regression (2), the coefficients of the Gini coefficient and the interaction term are signifi-
cantly negative. This implies a significant correlation between income inequality and the
national price level, and this correlation is decreasing in per capita income. Notice that
the coefficient on income has risen substantially. However, when we evaluate the overall
effect of income at the mean value of the Gini coefficient (0.408), we find that the overall
impact of income is 0.165 (= 0.719− 1.359× 0.408), which is consistent with the result in
Regression (1). Therefore, Regression (2) is a better specification as it can capture both
the B-S relationship and the nonmonotonic relationship between income inequality and
the national price level. This explains why R2 increases from 0.388 in Regression (1) to
0.541 in Regression (2).17
To check that these regression results are not driven by outliers, the partial regression
plots for Regression (2) are also shown below. Panel (a) of Figure 8 is the bivariate plot
of log(Pj/PU.S.) against log(Yj/YU.S.). Panel (b), (c) and (d) show the partial regression
plots (controlling for other regressors) of log(Pj/PU.S.) against log(Yj/YU.S.), Gini and
Gini × log(Yj/YU.S.) respectively. We can see that after controlling for other regressors,
the slope of the B-S relationship in the partial regression plot (Panel (b)) is higher than in
the bivariate plot (Panel(a)). And the partial regression plots in Panel (c) and (d) show
significant negative relationships, as estimated in Regression (2). From these plots, it is
17Notice that the sample size changes from (1) to (2) due to the fact that the Gini coefficients are not
available for some countries. It can be shown that restricting the sample in (1) to the sample in (2) won’t
change the estimation results much. Therefore, any inference drawn from (1) and (2) are not caused by
the different sample sizes in the two regressions.
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clear that the estimated relationship in Regression (2) are not driven by a small number
of influential observations.
Figure 8: The B-S Relationship and Partial Regression Plots of Regression (2)
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Therefore, the results in Regression (2) are consistent with what the model predicts
in Proposition 3: per capita income has a positive impact on the national price level,
income inequality also has a significant impact on the national price level and the impact
is decreasing in per capita income. As robustness checks, Regressions (3) and (4) control
for VAT18 and population, with the latter being a proxy for market size to eliminate the
potential impact of quality on the price level that is due to market size. The estima-
tion results show that the inclusion of these two control variables does not change the
estimation result in (2). Moreover, both control variables are not significant at the 10%
18VAT stands for Value Added Tax. If a country has no VAT system, then the country’s sales tax or
goods and services tax (GST) will be used instead. These taxes are included in the final prices paid by
consumers, hence these tax rates are included in the regression in order to control for their impact on
the national price level.
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level.
Therefore, the results in Table 1 confirm the model’s predictions and show that income
inequality has a non-monotonic impact on the national price level. Moreover, the extra
amount of explanatory power it provides is significant.
4.2. Testing the Model: the ’M-goods’ Index
As the Balassa-Samuelson explanation of the national price level relies on the service
component in the national price level, in addition to the above test using the national
price level, I also want to test my model using a modified price index excluding all the
services. So I replicate the estimations in Table 1, but do so for the price level of M-group
(non-service) products and the national price level, which are both constructed using the
standard method used by the PWT, i.e. the Geary-Khamis (GK) method19, and the price
levels at the basic heading level from the ICP Benchmark Dataset 2005.20
All the estimation results are shown in Table 2.21 Pj,M/PU.S.,M is the price level of
M-group products of country j relative to the United States. In the first two regressions,
the relationships between the constructed national price level and income distribution are
consistent with the empirical results in Section 4.1. The slope coefficient in Regression
(1), i.e. the elasticity of the national price level with respect to per capita income is
significantly positive. In Regression (2), when the Gini coefficient and the interaction
of the Gini coefficient and per capita income are included, the coefficients of the Gini
coefficient and the interaction term are significantly negative. Regression (2) also raises
R2 from 0.527 in Regression (1) to 0.622.
In Regression (3) and (4), the same regressions are run for the price level of M-group
products. On inspection, we can find that all the above qualitative results in Regression
(1) and (2) in terms of the significance and the sign of estimated coefficients and the
improvement in R2 also hold for the case of M-group products. In Regression (3), per
capita income has a significantly positive impact on the price level. Regression (4) includes
the Gini coefficient and the interaction term as additional regressors and all estimated
coefficients are significant. The explanatory power of the two additional regressors also
increases R2.
19Using the EKS method generates very similar results.
20The national price level is constructed by aggregating the price levels of all basic headings. The price
level of M-group products is constructed by aggregating the price levels of all non-service basic headings.
The classification of basic headings is based on OECD (2006).
21The different sample size in Table 1 and 2 are due to the ability to construct the M-group price index
and the aggregate price index for Table 2. In Table 1, the national price levels in 2005 are from PWT
7.1, which covers 190 countries in 2005. Therefore, in column 1 of Table 1, the number of observations is
189 as Zimbabwe is excluded due to its very volatile exchange rate in 2005. While in Table 2, in order to
construct the price index for the M-group products, I have to use the price levels of basic headings from
the ICP Benchmark Dataset 2005. However, this dataset covers less countries than PWT 7.1 does and
it only covers 146 benchmark countries.
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Table 2: Income Distribution and the National Price Level: M-group products
Aggregate: log(Pj/PU.S.) M-group: log(Pj,M/PU.S.,M)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Yj/YU.S.) 0.269
∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.0213) (0.115) (0.0175) (0.0875)
Gini Index -2.981∗∗∗ -2.961∗∗∗
(0.715) (0.544)
Gini Index× log(Yj/YU.S.) -1.619∗∗∗ -1.546∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.226)
Constant -0.180∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗ -0.0168 1.083∗∗∗
(0.0525) (0.261) (0.0432) (0.198)
Observations 145 132 145 132
R2 0.527 0.622 0.352 0.551
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate significantly different
from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The price level of the M-group
products and the aggregate price level are aggregated using the GK method.
However, the improvement in R2 is much greater than the improvement from Regres-
sion (1) to Regression (2). In Regression (3), given the small slope coefficient, R2 is only
0.352, but including the Gini index and the interaction term increases R2 to 0.551 in
Regression (4). This implies that, compared with per capita income, income inequality
provides much more explanatory power for the price level of M-group products than for
that of services.
These empirical results can actually shed some light on the explanatory power of the
B-S model. The B-S explanation relies on the service component in the national price
level. However, it is shown that using a modified price index excluding all services basic
headings, the B-S relationship and the second distinctive prediction of the present theory
survive. Therefore, the present theory provides a full explanation for the fact that both
per capita income and income inequality matter for the price level of non-services, which
cannot be addressed by the B-S model.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides a new candidate explanation for the B-S relationship, which is
based on an appeal to mismeasured quality. The key assumption is that income elasticity
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of quality is non-negligible and tends to be higher for nontraded goods. The model implies
the B-S relationship, and a new distinctive prediction: keeping per capita income constant,
income inequality has a significant impact on the national price level and the impact is
decreasing in per capita income. I show that this second prediction is consistent with
empirical evidence. Furthermore, as the B-S model relies on the services component in
the national price level, I also repeat the empirical test using a modified index excluding
the ‘pure services’ categories. It is shown that even when services are excluded, the B-S
relationship, and the second distinctive prediction of the present theory survive.
In addition, the model’s predictions can also be supported by over-time evidence.
When the panel estimation of the B-S effect in Rodrik (2008) is extended to take into
account the impact of income inequality in various specifications, the estimation results
are consistent with the relationships between income distribution and the national price
levels predicted in this paper. The details are in an online appendix.
Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Equating (7) and (10) yields
kzz
kz
m z
−(kz+1)[
p(z)
Azτzγ
]1/(τ−1)dz
= kcc
kc
m [
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z)]−(kc+1)
∣∣∣∣αβ [p′(z) + zp′′(z)] + p′(z)
∣∣∣∣ dz
kzz
kz
m (
1
Azτ
)1/(τ−1)z−(kz+1)−γ/(τ−1)p(z)1/(τ−1)
= kcc
kc
m [
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z)]−(kc+1)
∣∣∣∣αβ [p′(z) + zp′′(z)] + p′(z)
∣∣∣∣ . (A.1)
This is a second-order nonlinear non-autonomous differential equation defining p(z), z ∈
[zm,∞). The boundary condition is
cm =
α
β
zmp
′(zm) + p(zm).
Here zm is the lowest quality that is viable in the equilibrium, which is determined by the
lowest income cm and the equilibrium price function p(z).
I adopt the standard method of undetermined coefficients to find a particular solution
of the form p(z) = bzd, with b, d > 0, which is then substituted into the market clearing
condition to solve for the values of the parameters b and d (Zwillinger (1997), P415).
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The first and second derivatives of the postulated price function form are
p′(z) = bdzd−1 and p′′(z) = bd(d− 1)zd−2. (A.2)
Substituting (A.2) into (A.1) yields
kzz
kz
m (
b
Azτ
)1/(τ−1)z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)/(τ−1)
= kcc
kc
m [b(
α
β
d+ 1)]−(kc+1)(
α
β
d2 + d)bz−d(kc+1)+d−1. (A.3)
Since (A.3) holds for any value of z and both l.h.s. and r.h.s. are power functions of
z, it must be true that the two parameters of the power functions on both sides are equal:
kzz
kz
m (
b
Azτ
)1/(τ−1) = kcckcm [b(
α
β
d+ 1)]−(kc+1)(
α
β
d2 + d)b (A.4)
and
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)/(τ − 1) = −d(kc + 1) + d− 1. (A.5)
From (A.5),
d(kc) =
kz + γ/(τ − 1)
kc + 1/(τ − 1) . (A.6)
and it is easy to show that d′(kc) < 0.
Substituting (A.6) into (A.4) can solve for the other parameter b in the price function:
b(kc, cm) =

kcc
kc
m
[
α
β
kz+γ/(τ−1)
kc+1/(τ−1) + 1
]−kc kz+γ/(τ−1)
kc+1/(τ−1)
kzzkzm (
1
Azτ
)1/(τ−1)

(τ−1)/[kc(τ−1)+1]
. (A.7)
Therefore, a solution to the market equilibrium is
p(z) = b(kc, cm)z
d(kc)
=

kcc
kc
m
[
α
β
kz+γ/(τ−1)
kc+1/(τ−1) + 1
]−kc kz+γ/(τ−1)
kc+1/(τ−1)
kzzkzm (
1
Azτ
)1/(τ−1)

(τ−1)/[kc(τ−1)+1]
z
kz+γ/(τ−1)
kc+1/(τ−1) , z ∈ [zm,∞),
where zm satisfies
cm =
α
β
zmp
′(zm) + p(zm).
Q.E.D.
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 1
Given the expenditure share of Z goods in (13), the impact of income inequality, i.e.
the impact of the Gini coefficient, is equal to
∂[p(z)/c]
∂Gini
=
∂[β/(αd+ β)]
∂Gini
=
∂[β/(αd+ β)]
∂d
∂d
∂Gini
.
Since d = [kz(τ − 1) + γ]/[kc(τ − 1) + 1] and Gini = 1/(2kc − 1), it can be shown that
∂d/∂Gini > 0. Moreover, ∂[β/(αd + β)]/∂d < 0, so ∂[p(z)/c]/∂Gini < 0, i.e. income
inequality has a negative impact on the expenditure share of Z goods.
As Gini = 1/(2kc − 1) and µ = cmkc/(kc − 1), changing per capita income while
keeping the Gini coefficient constant has no impact on kc or d and hence expenditure
shares. Q.E.D.
A.3. Derivation of the Average Expenditure on Z goods p¯
Given the market equilibrium price schedule p(z), we can calculate the average ex-
penditure on Z goods p, which is the total expenditure on Z goods divided by the total
number of units as follows:
p =
∫∞
zm
p(z)Qs(z)dz∫∞
zm
Qs(z)dz
=
∫∞
zm
bzdkzz
kz
m (
b
Azτ
)1/(τ−1)z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)/(τ−1)dz∫∞
zm
kzzkzm (
b
Azτ
)1/(τ−1)z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)/(τ−1)dz
= b
∫∞
zm
z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)/(τ−1)+ddz∫∞
zm
z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)/(τ−1)dz
= b
[
z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)/(τ−1)+d+1
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)/(τ − 1) + d+ 1 |
∞
zm
]
/
[
z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)/(τ−1)+1
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)/(τ − 1) + 1 |
∞
zm
]
.
Since from (12), −(kz + 1) + (d− γ)/(τ − 1) + d+ 1 = (1− kc)d < 0,
p =
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)/(τ − 1) + 1
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)/(τ − 1) + d+ 1bzm
d. (A.8)
As cm = (α/β)zmp
′(zm) + p(zm) from Lemma 1 and p(z) = bzd,
bzdm = [β/(αd+ β)]cm. (A.9)
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Therefore, (A.8) and (A.9) imply
p =
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)/(τ − 1) + 1
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)/(τ − 1) + d+ 1
β
αd+ β
cm. (A.10)
Substituting (12) into (A.10) yields
p =
kc
kc − 1cm
β
αkz+γ/(τ−1)
kc+1/(τ−1) + β
.
As the Gini coefficient and the mean of the Pareto income distribution are equal to
1/(2kc − 1) and kccm/(kc − 1), we can express the average expenditure in terms of the
mean and the Gini coefficient:
p = µ
β
α kz+γ/(τ−1)
(1/Gini+1)/2+1/(τ−1) + β
. (A.11)
which is just equal to the product of per capita income µ and the expenditure share on
Z goods given (12), (13) and Gini = 1/(2kc − 1).
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2
Given (14), τ > 1 and p∗ = pη, we have
∂p∗
∂µ
= ηpη−1
∂p
∂µ
= ηpη−1
β
α kz+γ/(τ−1)
(1/Gini+1)/2+1/(τ−1) + β
> 0,
and
∂p∗
∂Gini
= ηpη−1
∂p
∂Gini
= ηpη−1µ
−αβ[
α kz+γ/(τ−1)
(1/Gini+1)/2+1/(τ−1) + β
]2
× kz + γ/(τ − 1)
[(1/Gini+ 1)/2 + 1/(τ − 1)]2
1
2Gini2
< 0. (A.12)
Thus, the impact of per capita income on the price level of Z goods is positive and the
impact of income inequality is negative.
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Differentiating (A.12) with respect to µ yields
∂2p∗
∂Gini∂µ
= η[(η − 1)pη−2 ∂p
∂µ
µ+ pη−1]
−αβ[
α kz+γ/(τ−1)
(1/Gini+1)/2+1/(τ−1) + β
]2
× kz + γ/(τ − 1)
[(1/Gini+ 1)/2 + 1/(τ − 1)]2
1
2Gini2
= η2pη−1
−αβ[
α kz+γ/(τ−1)
(1/Gini+1)/2+1/(τ−1) + β
]2 kz + γ/(τ − 1)[(1/Gini+ 1)/2 + 1/(τ − 1)]2 12Gini2 < 0.
Therefore, the impact of income inequality on the price level of Z goods is decreasing in
per capita income. Q.E.D.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3
Given the definition of the Paasche index,
PP =
(
1 · αd
αd+ β
+
p∗0
p∗
β
αd+ β
)−1
=
(
αd
αd+ β
+
(µ0
β
αd0+β
)η
(µ β
αd+β
)η
β
αd+ β
)−1
=
(
αd
αd+ β
+R β
αd+ β
)−1
, (A.13)
where R ≡ p∗0/p∗ = [µ0(αd+ β)]η/[µ(αd0 + β)]η.
Therefore,
∂R
∂µ
= −ηRµ−1 < 0 (A.14)
and
∂R
∂d
= ηR α
αd+ β
> 0. (A.15)
The impact of per capita income on the Paasche index can be obtained using (A.13)
and (A.14):
∂PP
∂µ
= −
(
αd
αd+ β
+R β
αd+ β
)−2
β
αd+ β
∂R
∂µ
=
(
αd
αd+ β
+R β
αd+ β
)−2
ηRµ−1 β
αd+ β
> 0. (A.16)
Hence, the impact of per capita income on the Paasche index is positive.
Similarly, the impact of income inequality on the Paasche index can be obtained by
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differentiating (A.13) with respect to Gini:
∂PP
∂Gini
= −
(
αd
αd+ β
+R β
αd+ β
)−2 [
α(αd+ β)− ααd
(αd+ β)2
+
∂R
∂d
β
αd+ β
+R −αβ
(αd+ β)2
]
∂d
∂Gini
=
(1− η)R− 1
(αd+Rβ)2 αβ
∂d
∂Gini
. (A.17)
To see how the impact of income inequality on the Paasche index changes with per
capita income, we can calculate the following second-order partial derivative using (A.17):
∂2PP
∂Gini∂µ
=
(1− η)(αd+Rβ)− 2β[(1− η)R− 1]
(αd+Rβ)3
∂R
∂µ
αβ
∂d
∂Gini
=
(1− η)αd− (1− η)Rβ + 2β
(αd+Rβ)3
∂R
∂µ
αβ
∂d
∂Gini
(A.18)
Now using (A.16), (A.17) and (A.18), we can derive how per capita income affects the
semi-elasticity of the Paasche index with respect to income inequality:
∂ePP ,Gini
∂µ
=
∂( ∂PP
∂Gini
1
Pp
)
∂µ
=
∂2PP
∂Gini∂µ
1
Pp
+
∂PP
∂Gini
1
−P 2P
∂PP
∂µ
=
(1− η)αd+ β
αd+ β
1
(αd+Rβ)2αβ
∂d
∂Gini
R(−η)µ−1, (A.19)
which implies that ∂ePP ,Gini/∂µ < 0.
Similarly, given the definition of the Laspeyres index,
PL = (1− β
αd0 + β
) +
p∗
p∗0
β
αd0 + β
= (1− β
αd0 + β
) +
[µ(αd0 + β)]
η
[µ0(αd+ β)]η
β
αd0 + β
= (1− β
αd0 + β
) +R−1 β
αd0 + β
. (A.20)
The impact of per capita income on the Laspeyres index can be obtained using (A.20)
and (A.14):
∂PL
∂µ
= −R−2 β
αd0 + β
R(−η)µ−1
= R−1 β
αd0 + β
ηµ−1 > 0. (A.21)
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In addition, the impact of income inequality on the Laspeyres index can be obtained using
(A.20):
∂PL
∂Gini
= −R−2 β
αd0 + β
∂R
∂Gini
= −R−1 β
αd0 + β
η
α
αd+ β
∂d
∂Gini
. (A.22)
Furthermore, differentiating (A.21) with respect to Gini yields
∂2PL
∂µ∂Gini
= −R−2 β
αd0 + β
ηµ−1
∂R
∂d
∂d
∂Gini
. (A.23)
Now, using (A.21), (A.22) and (A.23), we can derive how per capita income affects
the semi-elasticity of the Laspeyres index with respect to income inequality:
∂ePL,Gini
∂µ
=
∂[ ∂PL
∂Gini
1
PL
]
∂µ
=
∂2PL
∂Gini∂µ
1
PL
+
∂PL
∂Gini
1
−P 2L
∂PL
∂µ
= R−2 β
αd0 + β
η2
α
αd+ β
∂d
∂Gini
1
PL
[−R+ 1
PL
β
αd0 + β
]µ−1. (A.24)
From the definition of PL we have
PL
αd0 + β
β
=
αd0 + β
β
− 1 +R−1.
Thus,
1
PL
β
αd0 + β
=
1
(αd0 + β)/β − 1 +R−1 =
1
αd0/β +R−1 . (A.25)
Substituting (A.25) into (A.24) yields
∂ePL,Gini
∂µ
= R−2 β
αd0 + β
η2
α
αd+ β
∂d
∂Gini
1
PL
[−R+ 1
αd0/β +R−1 ]µ
−1
= R−2 β
αd0 + β
η2
α
αd+ β
∂d
∂Gini
1
PL
[
−Rαd0/β − 1 + 1
αd0/β +R−1 ]µ
−1
= R−2 β
αd0 + β
η2
α
αd+ β
∂d
∂Gini
1
PL
[
−Rαd0/β
αd0/β +R−1 ]µ
−1. (A.26)
Hence, ∂ePL,Gini/∂µ < 0.
Next, we will use the above results to show the signs of ePF,µ and ∂ePF,Gini/∂µ. Ac-
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cording to the definition of ePF ,µ and PF ,
epF ,µ =
∂PF
∂µ
µ
PF
=
∂(PPPL)
1
2
∂µ
µ
PF
=
1
2
(PPPL)
− 1
2 (
∂PP
∂µ
PL +
∂PL
∂µ
PP )
µ
PF
,
which is positive as ∂PP/∂µ > 0 and ∂PL/∂µ > 0.
Finally,
PF = (PPPL)
1
2
implies
logPF =
1
2
logPP +
1
2
logPL.
Differentiating both side with respect to Gini yields
1
PF
∂PF
∂Gini
=
1
2
1
PP
∂PP
∂Gini
+
1
2
1
PL
∂PL
∂Gini
,
which implies
ePF ,Gini =
1
2
ePP ,Gini +
1
2
ePL,Gini,
according to the definitions of ePF ,Gini, ePP ,Gini and ePL,Gini, i.e. the semi-elasticities of
PF , PP and PL with respect to Gini. Therefore,
∂ePF ,Gini
∂µ
=
1
2
∂ePP ,Gini
∂µ
+
1
2
∂ePL,Gini
∂µ
,
which is negative as ∂ePP ,Gini/∂µ < 0 and ∂ePL,Gini/∂µ < 0 from (A.19) and (A.26).
Q.E.D.
Appendix B
B.1. Data Sources
Data on disaggregate price parities and expenditure at the basic heading level come
from the ICP Benchmark 2005. Data on national price level, real per capita income and
population are taken from the Penn World Table 7.1 (PWT 7.1). All the conclusions in
this papers also hold for PWT 8.0 and PWT 8.1.
Data on the Gini coefficient are taken from the World Bank: World Development Indi-
cators. For those countries with the Gini coefficient missing in 2005, a linear interpolation
is used, if there are at least one observation before 2005 and one observation after 2005 for
a country. If the available observations for a country are all before 2005 or all after 2005,
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then the nearest neighbour interpolation is used. VAT data are from KPMG “Corporate
and Indirect Tax Survey 2011”.
Data on housing quantities and value come from 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) Chartbook. Data on vehicle quantity and expenditure are taken from 2005 Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) Tables. Expenditure and quantity for different types
of clothes are extracted from 2005 CEX Interview Survey microdata. Data on OECD
consumption expenditure in 2005 are downloaded from OECD iLibrary.
The relative importance of income elasticity of quality for 66 durable goods is based
on Table 4 of Bils and Klenow (2001). The tradability for each good is constructed
as the ratio of imports to gross domestic demand, using the data from US Benchmark
Input-Output Data in 2002.
B.2. Product Classification
According to OECD (2006), all basic headings are classified into ND (non-durable),
SD (semi-durable), D (durable), S (service), IS (individual service), CS (collective service)
and IG (investment goods) by nature of its output. In this paper, the basic headings
of services, including S (service), IS (individual Service) and CS (collective service) are
defined as the S-group products, while the rest of the basic headings are defined as the
M-group products.
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Appendix C
C.1. A Modified Version of Figure 1 Showing the Industry Labels
Figure 1 Modified: The B-S Estimation: Services vs. Non-Services
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Notes: a and b are the intercept and slope from the B-S estimation. The open
diamonds and the dark squares represent the estimates from services and non-
services respectively. Data from Zimbabwe are not included in the estimation due
to its volatile exchange rate in 2005. The basic heading of Passenger Transport
by Air is excluded from the figure, as its B-S relationship is downward-sloping.
Please see above a modified version of Figure 1 showing the industry labels for all the
data points. The correspondence table between the industry labels and the full industry
names is shown below. We can see that the service sectors that depend little on tradeables,
such as housing and hairdress, have large positive estimates of b, while the service sectors
depend more on tradeables, such as telephone service, have small estimates of b. So this
modified figure provides more supporting evidence for using the estimates of a and b to
separate the industries, for which costs are mainly local labour costs, from the industries,
for which costs are mainly the international costs of tradeables.
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Table: The Correspondence Table between Industry Labels and Industry’s Full Names
Basic
Heading Label Full Name
Code
1101111 rice Rice
1101112 cereal ot Other cereals and flour
1101113 bread Bread
1101114 bakery ot Other bakery products
1101115 pasta Pasta products
1101121 beef Beef and veal
1101122 pork Pork
1101123 lamb Lamb, mutton and goat
1101124 poultry Poultry
1101125 meat ot Other meats and preparations
1101131 seafood fresh Fresh or frozen fish and seafood
1101132 seafood preserved Preserved fish and seafood
1101141 milk fresh Fresh milk
1101142 milk preserved Preserved milk and milk products
1101143 cheese Cheese
1101144 egg Eggs and egg-based products
1101151 butter Butter and margarine
1101153 fat ot Other edible oils and fats
1101161 fruit fresh Fresh or chilled fruit
1101162 fruit preserved Frozen, preserved or processed fruits
1101171 vegetable fresh Fresh or chilled vegetables
1101172 potato fresh Fresh or chilled potatoes
1101173 vegetable preserved Frozen or preserved vegetables
1101181 sugar Sugar
1101182 jam Jams, marmalades and honey
1101183 confectionery Confectionery, chocolate and ice cream
110119 food product Food products n.e.c.
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110121 coffee Coffee, tea and cocoa
110122 soft drink Mineral waters, soft drinks,
fruit and vegetable juices
1102111 spirits Spirits
1102121 wine Wine
1102131 beer Beer
110220 tobacco Tobacco
1103111 clothing material Clothing materials and accessories
1103121 garment Garments
1103141 clothing repair Cleaning and repair of clothing
1103211 footwear Footwear
1103221 footwear repair Repair and hire of footwear
110410 housing rental Actual and imputed rentals for housing
110430 housing repair Maintenance and repair of the dwelling
110440 housing water Water supply and miscellaneous
services relating to the dwelling
110442 housing ot Miscellaneous services relating to the dwelling
110451 electricity Electricity
110452 gas Gas
110453 fuel ot Other fuels
110511 furniture Furniture and furnishings
110512 carpet Carpets and other floor coverings
110513 furniture repair Repair of furniture, furnishings and floor coverings
110520 household textile Household textiles
110531 appliances major Major household appliances whether electric or not
110532 appliances small Small electric household appliances
110533 applicances repair Repair of household appliances
110540 utensil Glassware, tableware and household utensils
110551 tool major Major tools and equipment
110552 tool small Small tools and miscellaneous accessories
110561 nondurable housegood Non-durable household goods
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1105621 domestic service Domestic services
1105622 houseservice Household services
110611 pharmaceutical Pharmaceutical products
110612 medical ot Other medical products
110613 therapeutical Therapeutical appliances and equipment
110621 medical service Medical Services
110622 dental Dental services
110623 paramedical Paramedical services
110630 hospital Hospital services
110711 car Motor cars
110712 motor cycle Motor cycles
110713 bicycle Bicycles
110722 transport fuel Fuels and lubricants
for personal transport equipment
110723 transport repair Maintenance and repair
of personal transport equipment
110724 transport ot Other services in respect
of personal transport equipment
110731 transport railway Passenger transport by railway
110732 transport road Passenger transport by road
110733 transport air Passenger transport by air
110734 transport sea Passenger transport by sea and inland waterway
110735 transport combined Combined passenger transport
110736 transport otservice Other purchased transport services
110810 postal Postal services
110820 telephone equipment Telephone and telefax equipment
110830 telephone service Telephone and telefax services
110911 audio visual equipment Audio-visual, photographic
and information processing equipment
110914 recording Recording media
110915 audio visual repair Repair of audio-visual, photographic
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and information processing equipment
110921 recreation major Major durables for outdoor and indoor recreation
110931 recreation ot Other recreational items and equipment
110933 garden Gardens and pets
110935 pet Veterinary and other services for pets
110941 sport Recreational and sporting services
110942 cultural Cultural services
110943 chance game Games of chance
110950 papers book Newspapers, books and stationery
110960 holiday Package holidays
111000 education Education
111110 catering Catering services
111120 accommodation Accommodation services
111211 hairdress Hairdressing salons and
personal grooming establishments
111212 personal care Appliances, articles and products for personal care
111220 prostitution Prostitution
111231 jewellery Jewellery, clocks and watches
111232 personaleffect ot Other personal effects
111240 social protection Social protection
111250 insurance Insurance
111261 financialservice FISIM
111262 financialservice ot Other financial services n.e.c
111270 service ot Other services n.e.c.
111300 netpurchase abroad Net purchases abroad
130221 govhealth compensation Compensation of employees(Government health)
130222 govhealth intermediate Intermediate consumption(Government health)
130223 govhealth surplus Gross operating surplus(Government health)
130224 govhealth nettax Net taxes on production(Government health)
130225 govhealth sale Receipts from sales(Government health)
130421 govedu compensation Compensation of employees(Government education)
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130422 govedu intermediate Intermediate consumption(Government education)
130423 govedu surplus Gross operating surplus(Government education)
130424 govedu nettax Net taxes on production(Government education)
130425 govedu sale Receipts from sales(Government education)
140111 govcollective compensation Compensation of employees(Government collective)
140112 govcollective intermediate Intermediate consumption(Government collective)
140113 govcollective surplus Gross operating surplus(Government collective)
140114 govcollective nettax Net taxes on production(Government collective)
140115 govcollective sale Receipts from sales(Government collective)
150110 machinery metal Metal products and equipment
150120 machinery transport Transport equipment
150210 construction residential Residential buildings
150220 construction nonresidential Non-residential buildings
150230 construction civilengineer Civil engineering works
150300 construction ot Other products
C.2. Characterizing Disaggregate B-S Relationships
To get an idea of how the B-S effect varies across products and countries, we plot
the scatter diagrams of the price level against GDP per capita (in logarithm) relative to
the US for each basic heading in Figure C.1. On inspection, we can identify a clear and
striking empirical pattern: for some products, the B-S relationship is weak and disperse.
For example, in the case of cars (2) and small appliances (8), the B-S effect is insignificant
and GDP per capita has no predictive power for the price levels. While for other products,
the B-S relationship is highly nonlinear: within low- and middle- income countries, the
relationship between per capita income and the price level is weakly positive, while within
high income countries, there is a sudden increase in the slope of the positive relationship.
For example, in the case of compensation of employees in government-produced health
services (121), the B-S relationship is not stable across countries. The elasticity of the
price level with respect to per capita income is large within rich countries, while the
elasticity is not significant among low- and middle- income countries.
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Figure C.1: Disaggregate Price Level of Basic Headings and GDP Per capita
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Notes: Zimbabwe is excluded from the figures due to its volatile exchange rate in
2005.
C.3. Income Elasticities of Quality and Quantity
In the traditional literature, if the price function is linear and the unit price is constant,
prices usually do not play a role and consumption (physical quantity) is equivalent to
consumption expenditure. Hence consumption quantity and consumption expenditure
are used interchangeably.
However, as expenditure is in general the product of quantity and unit price, which
depends on the quality of the good, income elasticity of expenditure can be decomposed
into income elasticity of quantity and income elasticity of quality (unit price) as follows:
eexpenditure =
dlog(consumption expenditure)
dlog(income)
=
dlog(quantity × unit price)
dlog(income)
=
d[log(quantity) + log(unit price)]
dlog(income)
=
dlog(quantity)
dlog(income)
+
dlog(unit price)
dlog(income)
= equantity + equality.
As consumption goods differ in their income elasticities of quantity and quality as
shown in Bils and Klenow (2001), here I divide all consumption goods into two groups
according to the relative magnitudes of these two elasticities. The first type of goods,
which is denoted as X goods, has a very low income elasticity of quality but a high income
elasticity of quantity. The other type of goods, which is denoted as Z goods, has a very
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high income elasticity of quality but a low income elasticity of quantity. Expenditure and
quantity data from the U.S. are used to identify which type a particular consumption
category belongs to. We focus on four categories of consumption goods, namely food,
housing, clothes and vehicles. It is shown below that the income elasticities of quantity of
food and housing are close to zero and the income elasticity of quality of clothes is close
to zero, while both elasticities are nonzero for vehicles.
Table C.1 shows that these four categories plus hotels and restaurants account for
on average more than 60% of the total expenditure within OECD countries in 2005,
and the expenditure on those goods with low income elasticity of quantity, such as food
and housing, constitutes on average around 70% of the total expenditure on these five
categories. Food at restaurant is a substitute of food at home and staying at a hotel is a
substitute of staying at home. Therefore, hotels and restaurants are also classified as Z
goods, just like food and housing. Hence it is important to incorporate Z goods into the
model due to its significant expenditure share.
Table C.1: Expenditure Shares of Food, Housing, Apparel, Transportation and Restaurants and
Hotels within OECD countries in 2005
Share of Share of Share of Z goods
the Five Categories Z goods within the Five Categories
Max 0.751 0.508 0.805
Min 0.466 0.314 0.630
Average 0.610 0.426 0.700
Standard Deviation 0.051 0.041 0.041
Food
As has been documented in the literature, calorie intake does not vary with perma-
nent income across households. Specifically, Aguiar and Hurst (2005) find that employed
household heads with a higher level of income consume similar amounts of calories as em-
ployed household heads with a lower level of income. However, conditional on log calories,
they find that the income elasticities of vitamin A and vitamin C are over 0.30 and the
income elasticities of vitamin E and calcium are 0.17 and 0.08, respectively. In addition,
the income elasticity of cholesterol is negative.
The results suggest that the income elasticity of quantity for food is very close to
zero. Households with higher income do not consume a larger quantity of food than
households with lower income. Instead, they consume higher quality foods, such as those
rich in vitamin and calcium. On the other hand, low income households consume cheaper
calories by having more fat and cholesterol in their food.
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Housing
As for housing consumption, the number of houses counts as quantity whereas other
characteristics of a house, such as square meters, all count as quality. Micro-evidence
has shown that the price function of housing is nonlinear. For example, Anderson (1985)
estimates the hedonic price function of housing, i.e. regressing housing prices on charac-
teristics of houses, which include structural characteristics of the house, improvements to
the house, physical characteristics of the lot, neighbourhood characteristics, etc. He shows
that the price function is convex. Even if housing quality is defined by square meters, the
price function is still estimated as a convex function. For example, Coulson (1992) esti-
mates a nonparametric response of housing price to floorspace size. The marginal price
is estimated to be increasing, which implies a convex price function. Mason and Quigley
(1996) estimate the hedonic price indices for downtown Los Angeles and they find the
price function is convex in size (1000 sq ft). Also, Bao and Wan (2004) find that the sale
price per square foot is increasing in gross area controlling for other characteristics using
Hong Kong data.
I use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) to compute the number
of residences, total value of residences and value per residence by percentile of income.
Figure C.2 plots the results for 2004.
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Figure C.2: Housing Quantity and Quality by Percentile of Income in 2004
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Notes: The families without a residence are excluded from the fig-
ures. Value per residence is obtained by dividing total value of
residences by the average number of residences.
By inspection, one can notice that as we move from low percentiles of income to high
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percentiles of income, the number of residences only changes modestly and almost all the
variations in total value of residence is due to the variations in value per residence. This
implies a very low income elasticity of quantity.
Clothes
The detailed expenditure and quantity data on clothes are extracted from the raw data
files of 2005 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The total expenditure on a certain
type of clothes is divided by the number of clothes to get the unit price. Figure C.3 plots
the total expenditure and the unit price for different types of clothes across nine income
classes. The white bars denote the total expenditure and the dark bars denote the unit
price. It is shown that for all types of clothes, unit prices are almost the same for all
income classes, which suggests a very low income elasticity of quality.
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Figure C.3: Total Expenditure and Unit Price for Different Types of Clothes in Dollars by Income Class
in 2005
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Notes: White bars denote total expenditure and dark bars denote unit price. The unit
price is defined as the ratio of total expenditure to the average number of units. The
nine income classes are: less than $5,000, $5,000 to $9,999, $10,000 to $14,999, $15,000 to
$19,999, $20,000 to $29,999, $30,000 to $39,999, $40,000 to $49,999, $50,000 to $69,999,
$70,000 and over.
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Vehicles
Data on quantity and expenditure of vehicles are also taken from the CEX. Figure C.4
plots the number of vehicles, total value of vehicle purchases and unit value per vehicle
across income classes. It shows that neither income elasticity of quantity nor income
elasticity of quality is close to zero. As we move from lower income groups to higher
income groups, both quantity and quality increase significantly.
In addition to the four consumption categories noted above, Bils and Klenow (2001)
also document the relative importance of income elasticities of quality and quantity for
66 durable goods in the CEX. Their results are consistent with the above evidence. For
example, the income elasticity of quality of clothes is very low and the income elasticities
of quantity and quality of vehicles are of the same magnitude.
In summary, the evidence presented shows that the income elasticities of quantity of
food and housing are close to zero, the income elasticity of quality of clothes is close to
zero and both are nonzero for vehicles. Some may argue that the observed elasticities are
equilibrium outcomes, which are endogenous, so the observed patterns cannot be taken
as primitives in the model. However, the observed elasticities, such as the zero income
elasticity of quantity of food and housing, are not due to equilibrium outcomes, but due to
the nature of the goods. For example, daily calorie intake has to be within a certain range
regardless of income and for convenience, a household usually has one primary residence.
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Figure C.4: Vehicle Quantity and Quality by Percentile of Income in 2005
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Notes: Value per vehicle is obtained by dividing total value of vehicles by the average
number of vehicles.
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C.4. Tradability and Income Elasticities of Quality and Quantity
In addition to the fact that consumption goods differ in income elasticities of quality
and quantity, empirical evidence also suggests that goods with relatively high income
elasticity of quality tend to be nontraded goods, while goods with relatively high income
elasticity of quantity tend to be traded goods. This is the empirical motivation for why
this paper just focuses on two types of goods in the model without loss of generality:
traded homogeneous goods and nontraded vertically differentiated goods.
To show the correlation between tradability and income elasticities of quality and
quantity, this subsection focuses on the 66 durable goods studied in Bils and Klenow
(2001). For these goods, they have estimated the relative importance of income elasticities
of quality and quantity, as measured by the relative slope of the quality Engel curve,
which is the slope of quality Engel curve relative to the sum of the slopes of quality
and quantity Engel curves. To measure the tradability of these goods, I first match the
goods in Bils and Klenow (2001) with the commodities in the 2002 Benchmark Input-
Output Tables of the U.S. Then for each commodity in the Input-Output Tables, I define
a tradability measure using the ratio of imports to gross domestic demand, i.e. the sum
of consumption, investment and government demand for the commodity. This tradability
measure will be used as a proxy for the tradability of the corresponding good in Bils
and Klenow (2001). The motivation for the measure is that it can show us the extent to
which the domestic demand of these goods must rely on imports. A higher ratio, i.e. a
higher degree of dependence on imports, implies that the good is more likely to be priced
internationally rather than locally and hence it is more like a tradable good. Figure C.5
plots the tradability measure against the relative slope of the quality Engel curve and
shows that there is a negative relationship between the two, which can be confirmed by
their correlation coefficient −0.244 with a p-value of 0.043. In addition, their spearman’s
rank correlation is −0.239 with a p-value of 0.048. The significant negative relationship
between tradability and income elasticity of quality suggests that we may abstract from
other goods and focus on the traded homogeneous goods and the nontraded vertically
differentiated goods in the model in order to make a sharp contrast of the roles played by
these two types of goods.
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Figure C.5: Tradability vs. Income Elasticity of Quality
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Notes: The data points in the figure represent the 66 durable goods studied in Bils and
Klenow (2001). The relative slopes of quality Engel curve are based on their estimates.
The tradability is defined to be the ratio of imports to gross domestic demand.
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